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The  idea of Community  Ergonomic  Research developed  out of previous 
experience with a  Community  research project  on  industrial safety in 
the  ECSC. 
At  a  time when  the  scope of recent  experience  in  the area of 
ergonomic  action is being  questioned  (1),  it seems  reasonable  to  look 
into the practical conclusions of reflection on  systems  of work,  their 
functioning  and  safety,  which  began  in the context of this  first 
Community  research. 
The  theoretical knowledge  has  been  set out  in a  printed work  (2) 
and  has  given rise to  training experiments.  These  experiments  and  the 
discussions  which  followed  led  to  the drafting of this report whose 
conclusions  coincide in many  respects with  those  reached  in the document 
cited in footnote  (1). 
Dr  U.  VIDAL! 
Director 
Luxembourg,  25  May  1975 
(1)  Methods  and criteria for  ergonomic  adaptation of industrial work, 
by  Mr  THEUREAU  and  Mr  WISNER. 
(2)  Reliability and  safety - Studies of industrial physiology and 
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Foreword 
This  document  was  written at the  end of the  experimental  seminar in Pont-A-
MOusson  organized on  19,  20,  21  and  22  June  1974  by  the Commission of the 
European Communities,  but it is not  a  faithful  account of that  seminar  :  it 
merely outlines  the ideas  put  forward  on  that occasion,  develops  them  further, 
and  looks at  them  from  a  new  angle. 
Readers  who  are  particularly interested in this  seminar on 
"Safety and  safety training",  intended  for  trade unionists  from 
France,  Belgium and  Luxembourg,  should consult  the working  report prepared 
at  its conclusion  (1).  Reference will be made  in the  following  pages  to a 
number  of texts distributed to  the participants  :  so  as  not  to  complicate our 
analysis  by  excessively  long descriptive commentaries,  we  simply refer the 
reader  to  the basic  documents  available  from  the Commission  of the European 
Communities  (2). 
Finally,  a  full description of the  teaching material  used at this  seminar  can 
be  found  in the  final  scientific report  or Research Project No.  6242/11/04  (3). 
(1):  "Safety and  Safety Training".  Cyclostyled report,  Free University of 
Brussels,  1974. 
(2):  Primarily  :  1.  An  Italian document  on  the  "Working  Environment"  produced 
jointly by  the  three Italian Trade  Union  Confederations 
2.  "Reliability Factors",  Industrial Psychology Laboratory of 
the Free University of Brussels,  1974. 
(3):  "Research on  the  structure and organization of the working  environment 
with reference  to  safety  training in safety and  reliability.  A few 
teaching  tools  and  their area of application",  cyclostyled report,  Free 
University of Brussels,  1973. 
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One  further note  :  our analysis  has  been determined  by  past experi-
ence  and  we  have not made  generalisations.  Our  references  to  research re-
late to  research work  conducted  in the  field by University  teams  which are 
not  connected with  the industrial undertakings  concerned;  similarly,  the 
training referred  to was  carried out  by  a  group  of persons  indirectly linked 
with  the Commission  of the  European Communities.  This detail is  important 
when  it comes  to drawing  conclusions  as  to  the role which  these bodies 
should play;  the role of the  EEC  Commission  in safety training is not  iden-
tical with,  for  example,  the role in safety training of the  trade unions. 
Consequently,  these notes must  be  read  in the specific context of action 
taken  by  the Commission. 
V.D.K. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
These  notes  are  the result of a  comparison  of research projects con-
ducted over  a  number  of years  in the area of safety and  of subsequent  training 
experiments. 
The  Industrial Psychology Laboratory of the Free University of Brussels  *) 
has  conducted  a  series of studies  in the mines  and  the steel industry since 
1967.  These  studies,  which must  be  seen in conjunction with  the work  of 
French and  Italian experts,  have  !ed to a  new  and  broader concept  of  safety. 
The  concept  of safety in  the strict sense of the  term - i.e.  concerned  solely 
with accidents  followed  by  physical  injury  - has  changed  :  in future,  atten-
tion may  be  centred  less  on  the accident  as  such  than on  the circumstances 
leading up  to it;  for  instance,  on  the technical  incident or breakdown which 
is  frequently noted before an accident. 
The  idea of an irregularity or breakdown  enabled us  to  go  beyond  the individ-
ual  and  to consider the production  system which  includes  both men  and  machines. 
In this way  two  major obstacles  to  preventative action were  no  longer consid-
ered inevitable because  they could be  foreseen  beforehand  through incidents; 
moreover  they were  no  longer considered attributable solely to  human  error or 
failure.  Instead,  accidents  were  seen as  a  symptom  of a  more  general mal-
functioning  - of the  system as  a  whole. 
This  approach  led  to  researc-h into  the various  factors  which influ-
ence  the reliability of the  system,  i.e.  the confidence which can be  placed 
in it. 
*)  Under  the aegis of the ECSC 
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These  factors  - known  as  risk or reliability factors  - were  always  linked 
with an operational objective;  they could  be modified  in order to  improve 
safety.  In other words  attention was  not  focused  on  factors  which  cannot 
be  influenced  - e.g.  hypothetical accident  proneness,  impact  of psychological 
components  such as  aggression  or  frustration,  influence of a  disturbed 
family  environment  etc ...  The  causal  role of these  factors  in certain 
accidents  could  not  be  disregarded;  but  as  such  factors  cannot  be controlled, 
the only possible solution would  be  to make  an  appropriate  selection of em-
ployees,  which  was  not  our  aim  in this instance. 
It is therefore apparent  that  the choice of a  given category of  factors 
presupposed  a  close  link between  research and  practical measures  even if 
that  link was  not  immediately explicit. 
To  begin with  a  link was  created between  research and  training 
the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  desirous of ensuring wide 
distribution  for  the studies  subsidized by it, asked  the  research bodies 
to  engage  in training action.  Thus  the Psychology Laboratory of the Free 
University of Brussels was  entrusted with  the  task of preparing  teaching 
material  capable of backing up  the results of the  theoretical work. 
Training manuals,  case studies,  films  and  instructional games  were  pre-
pared.  They  all reflected  one central idea  :  safety is 
not  a  matter of rules  and  standards  and  cannot  be  learnt; it must  be  based 
on  the individual's  own  analysis of his working  situation.  Consequently, 
it is important  to  develop  his capacity  for analysis. 
These materials were  tested  in  the industrial and  trade union  envi-
ronments.  An  experimental  seminar  intended  for  union  representatives  from 
France,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  was  organized  in Pont-A-Mousson.  Innumerable 
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difficulties arose  - rejection of  some  material,  uncertainty when  confronted 
with risk factors,  criticism of the  concept of reliability etc .••  The  dif-
ficulties could quite easily be  listed and  commented  on;  it would  be  possi-
ble  to  review  the  teaching materials  and  exclude  the  elements  criticized; 
all the  ideas  put  forward  on  safety could  be  examined  and  those which  have 
led  to unanimous  criticism could  be  eliminated.  But  this work  of cutting 
and  pruning could  only be carried out after the  event.  In  fact  the diffi-
culties,  apparently isolated  from  each other,  which arise when  confronted 
with a  specific audience  in  specific  circumstances,  the apparently indepen-
dent  obstacles  - such as  criticism of productivity linked with reliability 
and  criticism of the game  aspect of  some  teaching materials  - ultimately 
lead  to  the  same  question  :  what  is the  link between  research,  training and 
practical action ? 
Practical action means  involvement  in a  real  industrial situation subject  to 
constant  social  and  economic  pressures with  the palpable presence of inter-
acting  forces  in  the  enterprise;  action is necessary if safety is to  be 
improved;  and if the purpose of theory is not  to  facilitate action and  lead 
to certain measures  why  should it be  confined  to  "operational"  factors  ?  If 
theoretical  research does  not  help  to encourage measures  influencing  factors 
detrimental  to reliability what  is its purpose  ?  If the  aim  of_  training is 
not  to develop  the analytical ability of  the participants  so  that  they can 
influence  the  system,  how  can it be  justified ?  How  can it be  expected  to 
succeed  ?  How  can it be  reconciled with rejection of the  idea of human  error 
as  the  sole cause of accidents  ? All  these  questions  raise problems  which were 
encountered  in the experiments  conducted  to  gain acceptance  for  accident  theory. 
To  understand  these problems  an  attempt must  be made  to  answer  the  questions 
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rather than  simply  to give an  exhaustive list;our conceptual  framework  must 
be better defined  and  an attempt made  to  remove  a  certain lack of precision 
and  resolve apparent contradictions. 
That  is the purpose of these notes.  We  think that if a  dialogue 
.  *) 
is  to  be  opened with  the workers  in the area of safety,  it is essential 
to clarify our objectives  and  take account of certain self-evident  facts. 
We  intend  therefore to  summarize  the situation,  circumscribe  the area in 
which  research,  training and  practical action take place and  seek  the 
linking  factors  between  them.  The  existence of these  linking  factors  which 
are often considered  self-evident but  are not  closely defined,  will have 
far-reaching  implications  for  the  future  and will  help  to pinpoint  those 
aspects which it seems  useful  to  examine  in more  detail later on. 
*) 
In this  text  the  term "worker"  is always  used  in the  broadest  sense,  i.e. 
to  denote  any person participating in the production system with refer-
ence  to  this technical  function. 
1657/75  e  - ACE - 7  -
2.  INITIAL  ASSUMPTIONS 
The  term "safety"  in the industrial environment often  implies  a 
compromise  resulting  from  the reconciliation of conflicting interests. 
Even if the concept  of'~afett'is replac,d by  that  of'~eliabiliti: one 
self-evident fact must  be  taken into account.  The  man-machine  system 
includes men,  in other words  individuals with special interests,  needs, 
aspirations  and  limits which are not only of a  physiological order but 
precisely reflect the state of a  given society  the  factory is a 
microcosm and  safety reflects all its tensions.  It is also  a  hunting 
ground  for all kinds  of projected notions  and  suspicions. 
If then safety is to  be discussed,  certain initial assumptions must  be 
defined  to  avoid  sharp criticism.  These  assumptions  may  appear self-
evident but  they  introduce an order of priority into  the objectives 
which must  not  be disregarded. 
They  also open  a  dialogue  :  there is too  often a  tendency  to  confuse 
the  fact  that  the position of certain research  teams  is external  to  the 
industrial  system with a  lack of any position on  the subject of safety. 
This  preamble will  help  to  remove  that  element of ambiguity. 
- a.  the human  objective 
- b.  the  factory as  the  focus  of attention 
- c.  safety at the intersection of an  interplay of  forces. 
- a.  The  human  objective of safety and  reliability 
Within  the industrial  system,  dominated  by production requirements, 
the primary consideration of safety is man,  his  health and  the avoidance of 
physical  injury.  Man  as  a  worker is the constant point of reference;  in a 
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society which  has  reached  the  level of technical  development  we  know 
today,  it is not  normal  for  individuals  to  have  to  set  their life at 
risk or prematurely wear  themselves  out at work. 
For  legal  and methodological  reasons,  the problems  of health 
and  safety were  for  a  long  time  considered  separately  :  yet  the  tenuous 
nature of this  formal  distinction is becoming  increasingly apparent. 
Changes  made  to  the production process  with  the  development  of  science and 
technology have  led  to  a  great  increase in the number  of workplaces  at 
which nervous  tension takes  the place of physical  fatigue  and where 
mental  and  psychosomatic  disorders  replace physical  injury.  The  new 
workplaces  do  not  cause  injury in the  same  way  as  the old ones  did  :  as 
a  result  the conventional  concept  o~ safety is altered.  The  aim must 
now  be  to protect  the mental integrity of individuals  and not  simply 
their physical well-being. 
This  change  in the nature of the problem has  specific consequences  for 
research. 
It compels  us  to  question  the validity of the  indices used  in studies  on 
safety. 
Accidents  and  incidents  - in the  sense of  technical  malfunct~ons  - were 
visible phenomena,  easy  to  locate in time  and  space  and  suitable objects 
for analysis. 
But  this  does  not apply  to  the disorders  caused  by  an  excessive mental 
strain.  When  do  such disorders  begin  ?  How  can  they be defined  ?  What 
is their cause  ?  One  method  of answering  these questions  has  been  to use 
indirect indices which can nevertheless  be  quantified;  the  influence of 
certain types of work  organization and of certain workplaces  on  individu-
als has  been  studied  through  the traces  left by  individuals  on  the pro-
cess  as  such  quality of work,  errors,  production etc •••  The  assumption 
then is that  a  deterioration in these indices  reflects a  lack of 
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suitability of the workplace or working method  for man  - and  this  lack of 
suitability is liable to  be  harmful  to  him  in one  way  or another.  This 
intellectual approach is commonplace  and  has  been used  in several  EEC 
research projects  on  safety. 
Nevertheless it raises  a  number  of problems  :  to  what  extent  can indirect 
technical  indices  reflect  human  malaise  ?  The  correspondence is not  abso-
lute.  Here,  interestingly enough,  we  come  to  one  of the criticisms made 
of research into reliability,  namely  the confusion  found  here between 
productivity and  safety as  though  these  two  notions  could  always  be per-
fectly  superimposed. 
By  using  indirect  indices  we  in fact  introduce  the  idea of  a  threshold or 
limit in safety which is incompatible with its objective and  intentions; 
attention is given  - with  a  view  to  adapting work,  reorganizing  the  system 
or modifying  the workplace  - only  to adverse working  conditions which 
influence production.  It still has  to  be  shown,  however,  that  an ulcer, 
at least in its early stages,  inhibits work,  that  repeated  insomnia 
prevents  the worker  from  performing  his  task on  the  assembly  line and 
that  a  heart attack is heralded  by  a  fall-off in production •.• 
It is worth quoting here  an  anecdote  reported  to  us  by  a  participant in 
a  training  seminar  :  a  factory with a  paternalistic approach used  always 
to  send its retired workers  a  new  year parcel.  These  parcels were  listed 
in registers  and  the union delegation decided  one  day  to  prepare  a 
breakdown  by  workshop  in the  factory.  This  investigation  showed  that in 
one particular sector there had  never  been  any  recipients of the parcels. 
An  inquiry was  made  and  the astonishing conclusion  reached  that  there was 
no  one  to  receive  a  parcel  because  no  one  ever left  the  workshop  to  go 
into retirement  All  the workers  quietly died before  reaching  retirement 
age .•.  A quite unusual  circumstance  had  been necessary  to  discover  this 
anomaly. 
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The  margin  between safety and  health,  between psychology  and  industrial 
medicine is narrowing  day  by  day  :  this  fact  cannot  be disregarded. 
That  is why  it is becoming  increasingly necessary in research conducted 
in the enterprise to  take  into account  not only indirect indices  linked 
with  the  technical process  but  also  subjective assessments  by  the 
workers  themselves;  that is  to  say  their assessments  of what  they  feel 
and  express  which cannot  be verified by  a  purely experimental  approach. 
Research workers  have of course never overlooked  these  subjective in-
dices  :  indeed  they  have often made  use of  them  to  construct  their hy-
potheses.  But  once  their hypotheses  had  been  defined,  they were vali-
dated  through  indices derived  from  the  t.echnical  process  which were  alone 
able  to  guarantee scientific objectivity. 
This  is a  rigorous  approach,  but  there are other possibilities;  a  sub-
jective index may  in fact  be verified by  a  second,  objective  index or ~ 
its repetition in a  similar context  by  a  collective evaluation of the 
workers  concerned. 
If thirty persons  in a  particular workshop  complain of headaches  there is 
no  need  to  look at  the particular type of production  to  incriminate  the 
conditions of work  as  a  whole.  This  is an  extreme  case,  but it is impor-
tant  to  recognize  that it may  be more  than a  mere  example  and  may  provide  the 
basis  for  a  method.  The  search for  subjective indices  and  their system-
atic organization in defined  situations  and  the creation of  a  typology  spe-
cific to  these indices may  be  a  new  way  of  looking at safety with  the 
guarantee of human  terms  of reference and with  the agreement  of the 
workers  concerned. 
We  shall return later  to  these  problems  as  they relate to research,  but it 
is worth stressing at  this  stage  that  the  fact  of giving priority to  a 
human  objective can  help  to clarify the basic  idea of reliability and 
incidents within  the production  system  :  in the man/machine  system,  the 
principal axis of reference is man.  The  breakdown or technical  incident 
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is  considered in relation to man  :  as  a  threat  to his health;  rather 
than  the opposite approach  :  human  failure  as  a  serious burden  on  the 
technical  system. 
Any  othe~ approach  to  the question  leads  to  a  profound  transformation of 
the problem of safety;and  the concept  of reliability,  instead of widening 
our horizons,  becomes  a  trap which  closes  round  the worker. 
- b.  The  factory as  the  focus  of attention 
We  are concerned  here with safety at work  :  safety cannot  be 
isolated  from  the work  itself and  touches  on all the conditions  in which 
work  is performed,  all the constraints bearing on it and  the  technologi-
cal development  changing it day  by  day.  Consequently,  still consid-
ering  the  link between  research,  training and practical action,  we  must 
define  the  framework  for  those activities. 
Since  the  industrial situation  is  the place where  accidents  occur  and 
the area in which practical measures  can be  taken,  it is normal  for it to 
be  taken also as  the point of departure  for  research and  theoretical 
considerations. 
Clearly,  there are close links  between  living conditions  and  behaviour 
at work  - a  worker who  is tired by  two  hours of  travel  in the morning 
will be more  vulnerable  than another,  cramped  and  insalubrious  premises 
are not  likely to make  for  a  relaxed state of mind  in the worker  - but 
this is a  two-way  relationship and,  for operational  reasons,  we 
start  from  the  production process. 
In analysing  the causes of accidents,  the  factors  which  can be directly 
influenced  are  considered first;  we  begin  by  considering  a 
change  in the organization and  working  conditions  and  then move  into  a 
wider context.  The  reasons  for  this choice are not  only methodological 
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but also pedagogical  - concentration on very general  and  remote  causes of 
unreliability must  be  avoided.  They are also  fundamental  work  and  the 
way  it is performed  and  organize~ and  the attendant risks,  are  seen as 
the mould  in which  the  face of human  society is cast. 
- c.  Safety at  the intersection of an  interplay of  forces 
While  in theory every undertaking is interested in safety,  in 
practice safety measures  are always  influenced  by  a  certain interplay of 
forces  within the undertaking,  by  a  fluctuating  economic  situation,  current 
legal provisions,  the nature of the particular factory which may  be  flexi-
ble or rigid,  and  by  the  specific beliefs of certain executives  etc ••• 
In short,  safety is ultimately the result of a  whole  set of shifting and 
contradictory influences.  The  basic  role of safety in  the complex  indus-
trial system completely determines  the measures  taken.  To  quote one 
example  :  an undertaking pays  a  set contribution  to  ensure its workers 
against accidents.  But  in  fact  the rate of this contribution depends  on 
the  number  of accidents  recorded  :  beyond  a  certain accident  frequency  the 
premium  is increased.  This  threshold or limit conditions  the  factory's 
policy on  safety  :  as  soon  as  the  limit is approached,  safety campaigns 
are organized  and  investments made  to  ensure  that  the critical level is 
not  reached. 
Another  example  a  steelworks  emits  a  high level of dust  and  fumes.  The 
workers  complain.  But  extraction of  the dust  and  fumes  would  require a 
very expensive  installation.  The  factory  therefore proposes masks  which 
interfere with  the work  and  are not  worn  by  the workers.  Shortly afterwards 
legislation becomes  more  stringent and  a  dust control  installation has  to be 
set up. 
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Further examples  could  be  quoted,  but  our aim is not  to  indulge  in easy 
criticism.  These  examples  help  to stress  that  safety cannot  be  isolated 
from  constraints arising  from  the real  industrial situation - it is not 
sufficient to  expose accidents or incidents;  safety will always  be  a 
matter  for discussion and  on  occasion  for confrontation.  The  economic 
criterion will play an  important part and  the social climate will not  be 
a  negligible factor  •••  It might  even  be maintained  that  the broadening 
of the concept  of safety to  cover all working  conditions and  the inclu-
sion of increasingly refined  indices  and  earlier analysis will not 
solve  these contradictions  :  they compel  us  to  take account of factors 
associated with  the well-being of workers  which are difficult to analyse 
statistically in the short-term.  And  few  enterprises are willing to 
envisage this at the present  time. 
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3.  RESEARCH 
If we  consider  the position of research in relation to 
training and  practical action rather than in isolation,  the potential  for 
change  and  transformation is  immediately apparent. 
We  propose  to  discuss  here  research as  an integral part of a  process of 
change.  At  the  same  time  research  is  considered as  a  scientific 
practice,  i.e.  a  privileged method  for  the development of knowledge.  This 
approach  determines  the  following observations. 
Is it possible to  conduct  research and  apply scientific practices in the 
area of safety,  and  if so  under what  conditions  ? 
What  is the position regarding  the generation of knowledge  ? 
Does  the obligation to work  in a  given place  - the industrial environment  -
on  living and  fluctuating material with a  situation consisting of a  whole 
range of constraints,  allow  room  for  scientific practice ? 
In an  attempt  to  answer  these questions  we  must  define what  we 
mean  by  scientific practices.  We  would  characterize the latter as  a  form 
of cognitive appropriation of reality thus  subscribing directly to  a 
materialistic line of thought.  This means  that reality - i.e.  the micro-
cosm of the  factory  - is the point of departure  for our  consideration;  but 
its appropriation implies more  than a  simple  translation  :  a  transformation 
of this reality into concepts which are defined  and  expressed in a  theory. 
We  call this  transformation "cognitive appropriation". 
Any  operation which consists  in sticking to  reality without venturing  into 
abstractions  and which tries to  report all the apparent movements  of reali-
ty is an  ideological enterprise,  since it involves all the  imaginary re-
presentations  required  for  the maintenance and  reproduction of certain 
living and  working  conditions,  without  going  beyond  those  representations. 
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Let  us  take  the case of an undertaking which,  faced with an  in-
crease in the  number  of accidents,  decides  to  send its staff to  follow 
courses of training in safety.  If its action is limited to  this initiative, 
the  ideological  dimension can very easily be.  isolated :  it means  that  in the 
analysis made  by  that enterprise of the causes  of accidents,  priority is 
given  to  the human  factor.  Man  had  the accident  and it is he  who  ultimately 
made  the mistake which  led  to physical  injury;  he must  therefore be 
trained  to  avoid  such errors in  future. 
This  superficial analysis  - which will be  found  in most  accident  r_eports  -
sticks very close to  the  facts  and  does  not  look  beyond  them.  An  accident 
report made  out  by  the Centre d 1Etudes  des  Problemes  Humains  du  Travail 
(Centre  for  the  Study of Human  Problems  of Work)  reflects  the  two  possible 
lines of investigation  : 
"At  14.30 on  3  July last, at truck hitching point  3  0001,  two  trucks were 
derailed on  the  empties  line.  The  hitcher left his post  to assist in re-
placing  the  trucks  on  the rails.  One  truck was  replaced and  the  second 
remained  resting on  the buffer of the first.  The  hitcher was  told to  go 
farther up  the  line and  try to  drop  the  truck back onto  the rails.  The 
dispatcher told him  to  hurry;  he  became  irritated, wanted  to  hurry and, 
while walking  down  the steps of the  basement of the control  station,  he -
slipped and  fell  on  the  small  of his back.  It was  15.00;  the hitcher had 
to  stop work.  A replacement  accustomed  to  this work  was  called up  but  he 
was  busy at  the higher level  and  needed  half an  hour  to  reach  the  scene. 
Meanwhile  the derailed truck was  put  back on  the rails and movement  had  to 
continue.  A  tractor driver,  Mr  DUPONT,  was  on  the  scene  and  available.  He 
was  asked  to  do  the work  and  everything was  done  successfully; 
Dupont  was  sitting on  the bench  hitching the  trucks.  The  replacement 
then arrived.  Dupont  turned  round  and  showed  him  a  hook  for  his 
haversack.  Accidentally he  placed his right  hand  on  the rail.  A passing 
truck crushed his  hand.  It was  then  15.50". 
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Many  interpretations can of course be given  to  this report.  The  easiest one 
is to attribute both accidents  to  a  lack of attention on  the part of the 
foreman,  Mr  Dupont,  and  the hitcher  :  the text  lends  itself to this inter-
pretation "he  became  irritated and wanted  to hurry",  "he accidentally placed 
his  hand" .•.  Another more  elaborate interpretation,  still centring.  on  the 
human  factor,  would  consider the succession of incidents  and not merely  the 
accident  as  such  :  it would  stress  the  lack of familiarity of the persons 
concerned with  the work  given  to  them.  The  normal  substitute is busy and 
Mr  Dupont  helps out  in the interval;  the hitcher leaves his post  to assist 
in replacing  trucks  on  the rails. 
The  description of the events is detailed enough  to  enable the idea of the 
human  factor  to  be  developed  :  it is not however  sufficiently detailed if we 
approach  the matter  from  a  different angle,  for  example,  if we  seek to.ascertain 
how  the work  is organized,  and  to  determine  the  type of relationship between 
maintenance  and  production,  and  the  technical  factor which caused  the  trucks 
to  become  derailed  - were  they  too  heavily  laden or were  the signals defective  ? 
In short,  there is not  sufficient  information to  attempt  to discover what  may 
cause  a  technical  incident  in the  technical process  involving all the various 
relationships,  capable in turn of disorganizing work  and creating incidents 
and  accidents.  Here  the analysis  is not  proposed  in terms  of the subject but 
in terms  of a  chain of events,  relationships  and  interaction. 
It is an  ideological decision to make  the individual  responsible,  even  in the 
broadest  and  least critical sense because  that  tends  to  hide other relation-
ships which  have  a  decisive effect on  the dynamic  of the production pro·cess. 
But  it is utopian to  suppose  we  can  live without  ideology  :  ideology is 
present  in all our social practices,  institutions and cultural values;  it is 
closely linked  - as  history  shows  - with the progress of science but  to 
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highlight  the contrasts  and  links between  research and  training it is 
important  to  recognize  the constant presence of ideology. 
The  mere  fact of using scientific techniques  does  not mean  that 
we  are  following  scientific practice  :  for  that  the  information gathered 
must  be  located  in a  system which  links,  explains  and  determines it.  A 
theory is required  to  explain and  locate  one  fact or element  in relation 
to others  :  it is not  sufficient to  accumulate  facts;  they must  be brought 
into relationship with each other.  An  analysis  is described as 
concrete  - as  the concrete is not  immediate  - if it expresses  a  situation 
in terms  of relationships  rather than providing an  isolated succession of 
items of information  faithfully reflecting reality. 
In this case  the cognitive appropriation would  therefore be  an  abstraction 
resituating objective  facts  in a  context where  relationships which  were 
initially hidden  come  to  light.  Thus  transformation of reality,  estab-
lishment  of relationships  and  production of concepts  are the key  elements 
enabling us  to  reconsider  the  research already undertaken  in the area of 
safety. 
Accident  theory proposes,  in a  manner  which  is perhaps 
restricted,  and  too heavily centred  on  the  technical  system  - where  other 
variables are  lacking  - a  canvas  to  explain certain phenomena  of unreliabil-
ity,  allowing  forecasts  to  be made  and  preventative action  taken. 
At  the  same  time it appears  still to  be  in the developmental  phase •.•  It 
seems  interesting  to us  to  consider  the achievements  to  date  in  the light 
of the above  considerations.  We  shall take as  our  reference  document  the 
popular manual  on  "Reliability factors"  intended more  specifically for 
*) 
training 
*) 
Manual  presented during  the  seminar  in Pont-A-Mousson,  June  1974. 
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This  text lists the risk  factors  discovered during  research and  subdivides 
them  into  three categories  : 
1.  Factors  linked with  the workplace  :  their impact will generally be 
mastered  by  ergonomic  adaptation.  Examples  are  lack of suitable adap-
tation to anthropometric  characteristics,  non-standardized adjustments, 
wear  on  the equipment  etc .•• 
2.  Factors  linked with  the work  situation and  organization  :  these  factors  are 
much  more  general  and  depend  on  the way  in which  tasks  are arranged  in 
relation to  each other.  They  include coactivity,  succession,  bottle-
necks  etc .••  Action on  these  factors  amounts  to  a  modification,  at least 
in part,  of the enterprise structures. 
3.  Factors  linked with man  :  this heading  includes primarily the  factors 
of human  knowledge of the process  - in  some  cases  these are risk factors 
change of workplace,  lack of adequate  training,  transfer,  rapid  techno-
logical development  etc •••  Even  when  they are in the nature of strictly 
behavioural characteristics,  these human  factors  are never assimilated 
with errors but,  as  we  shall  see later,  are explained  in  terms  of struc-
tures  and  organization of work. 
This  list therefore includes  two  groups  and  not  three kinds  of factors  : 
firstly,  factors  which  can  be qualified as  immediate  - linked with  the 
workplace  and  depending  on  a  single criterion:  an  anthropometric  characteristic, 
or physical characteristic of the  job  to  be  performed  - where  the problem is 
simply one of adapting  the  equipment  to  a  particular point;  secondly,  there 
is the group of factors  which  are not  immediately apparent  as  such since 
they lie at the intersection of a  wide  range of influences  - these are the 
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structural  factors  which cannot  be modified  in themselves  but only  through 
other action with wide-ranging  implications. 
The  document  on  reliability factors  is therefore not  homogeneous  :  a  sec-
ond classification - the  immediate  and  structural  - can be  superimposed on 
the apparent,  spatial classification - the workplace,  situation  and man. 
We  stress this other possible reading because it leads  to  the difficulties 
encountered  in training and,  to an  even greater extent,  in practical action. 
We  cannot  automatically  assume  that situational  factors  are of a 
structural nature and  workplace  factors  of an  immediate nature. 
A  few  examples will  suffice  to  show  that  such a  superficial classi-
fication  misses  the point;  these  examples  also  serve  to 
illustrate more  clearly our aims. 
1.  Factors  linked w.ith  the workplace 
Two  examples  are quoted  here.  One  is classified under  the heading 
"Lack of adaptation to anthropometric  characteristics"  and  concerns 
adjustments  to  the workplace made  without  reference  to  the individuals 
working  there,  e.g.  a  step which is too  high,  a  stairway which is too 
steep,  a  handle which  cannot  be  reached  by  a  man  of average height 
etc ..• 
The  second  relates  to  "catachresis";  catachresis means  here  the use of 
a  tool or a  working method  not originally intended  for  that particular 
job.  An  example  would be  the use of an  iron  tube as  a  lever attached 
to  a  wrench  to release a  recalcitrant bolt. 
It is not  sufficient in this case  simply  to  expose  the dangerous  process. 
When  we  look  into  the background  to  the catachresis we  find  reasons 
linked with  the organization of work  :  adequate  equipment  is not 
available or the distance which  has  to  be  covered  to  fetch it is too 
great,  or else the conventional method  has  resulted in failure  and 
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is no  longer used  etc .•.  The  phenomenon  of catachresis occurs very 
generally when  the organization of work  is poor  - or  in  the  event  of 
sudden disorganization following  an accident or an  incident  in the 
recovery phase  - and it can only be  countered or mastered  - must  we 
really prohibit all spontaneity in the performance of tasks  ?  - by 
acting on  factors  which are not  immediately apparent.  On  the other 
hand  once  the  inaccessible handle or the step which is too  high  has 
been altered to  suit average  human  dimensions  it  will  no  longer be 
a  reliability risk in that particular sector. 
2.  Factors  linked with situation 
The  factors  in question here are all structural in nature  - with 
one  exception.  They  express  the general  idea  that  the incident or 
accident  is  the result of a  phenomenon  of interference between 
schemes  of activity;  in this case it is  fairly easy  to  apply obser-
vations  borrowed  from  road  traffic. 
These  factors  in themselves  provide  a  satisfactory  framework  of 
interpretation  for many  work  situations  - and  immediately relate to 
problems  of  job organization and  structuring,  of relations  in the 
hierarchy and  so  on ••.  They  have  been called "reliability black 
spots".  One  example  among  many  others is the "frontier"  factor. 
It has  been  found  that  there is a  zone of unreliability in a  facto-
ry at the points where  there is a  change of service,  supervision or 
regulation separating successive activities in the production process. 
The  reasons  for  this are generally due  to  a  lack of communication 
between  the  services  and  a  lack of appropriate signalling. 
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That  at least is the first conclusion which  can  be  drawn.  But  it is 
worth  recalling here  the observations made  by  an  expert  in a  deter-
gent  powder  factory.  He  noticed  the close  functional  interrela-
tionship between  two  successive workplaces  in the production pro-
cess  accompanied  by  an  absence of any  exchange of information 
between  those workplaces.  In this particular instance,  the 
geographical distance between  these  two  places was  very short  :  it 
was  simply necessary  to  walk  a  few  dozen metres.  In fact,  however, 
that short distance was  never crossed  because  the operators at the 
two  workplaces  belonged  to  different areas  closely defined  in  the 
hierarchy and  limited  their geographical area of intervention, 
keeping  to  their separate zones. 
It seems  likely that  there are many  cases where  a  substantial in-
crease in the  fo~al channels of information would  not  suffice  for 
them  to  be used when  a  binding social division of work  is super-
imposed  on  the  technical division.  It is therefore apparent  that 
from  this angle  the  frontier  factor is much  more  complex  than might 
appear at first sight and  its far-reaching  ramifications  do  not 
lend  themselves  to purely mechanical  intervention. 
Attempts  to  render working  tasks  less  isolated  - for  example  certain 
experiments  carried out  by  Volvo  in Sweden  - involve  the  frontier 
areas  which often appear as walls  erected arbitrarily by  a  division 
of labour which  there is today  a  tendency  to  question  - and it is 
worth noting  that  the origins of this questioning may  be  extremely 
contradictory. 
Among  these structural  factors- which  include coactivity *), 
succession *)  intersection *)  and  bottle-necks  congestion  on  the 
factory  floor  *)  which  does  not  lend itself to  this categorization 
*) 
See  pages  13,  15,  16  and  17  of the document  entitled "Reliability 
factors". 
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should also be mentioned.  It belongs  in fact under  the heading of 
"Immediate  factors"  since direct action to  reduce it at once  can 
be carried out. 
3.  Factors  linked with man 
To  a  large extent  these  factors  gravitate around  the  idea that 
experience,  by  which  we  mean  experience of the specific characteris-
tics of a  task,  is  a  positive factor  in reliability;  when  there is 
a  lack of experience,  e.g.  because of a  change of workplace,  the 
reliability of  the  system is threatened.  But  the knowledge of the 
process at  issue here is not  simply ordinary knowledge of  the 
process;  on  the contrary it concerns  everything  specific  to  a  partic-
ular situation,  i.e.  the constant disparity  from  an  imaginary mean. 
Clearly  then  the acquisition of this knowledge  implies either 
training in situ,  which is not without  risks,  or the  spontaneous 
communication of the necessary information by more  experienced 
workers.  The  situation here  resembles  to  some  extent  that with  the 
succession  factor  :  people  cannot  be  forced  to  communicate when,  for 
a  variety of reasons,  they prefer to  keep  their knowledge  to  them-
selves.  This  is usually  the case with experience;  social conditions 
in the undertaking  - lack of status accorded  to certain tasks,  stimu-
lated rivalry between  individuals  - mean  that  experience  remains  of 
great personal value  so  that  the  remedy  cannot  be  sought  through training 
- what  type of training would  be possible since this is not  the 
kind of knowledge  available  from  technical manuals  on  the subject  ? 
Once  again we  are  faced  with a  non-immediate  factor  to which  there 
is no  simple  answer.  The  knowledge  factor is not  the only one at 
issue;  there is also  the attitude factor.  It is quite usual  to 
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suggest  that certain types  of behaviour are dangerous;  but  research 
has  shown  to what  extent  risk-taking is determined  by  factors  exter-
nal  to  the  individual  and  not  by an.instinctive taste for danger. 
A very interesting research project carried out  in the  French mines 
provides  a  convincing  example of the  hold of the  system over  the 
worker.  It follows  the  development  of  the behaviour of coal  face 
workers  with  reference  to  two  variables  :  the  ergonomic  variable of 
production and  the objective risk incurred at  the coal  face  which 
varies  as  a  function of  the state of undercutting of the  roof.  This  be-
haviour is  the direct result of a  compromise  between  the  requirements 
of production and  safety.  For  example,  with  an  equal  objective risk 
level,  differences  are  found  in the  safety of  the behaviour 
pattern adopted  depending  on  the pressures of production. 
0  0  0 
These  few  examples  taken  from  the document  on  reliability factors  and  from 
ECSC  reports  on  Community  research clearly show  the spirit in which work 
of this kind is carried out.  This  spirit accords  with  the scientific 
attempt  to  formulate  a  theory in  the  sense  in which  we  defined it previ-
ously.  The  factors  noted  - or  some  at least  that  we  have  stressed  - are 
expressed  in terms  of relationships;  they are  an  abstraction of immediate 
reality. 
*)  ' 
As  FAVERGE  puts it 
"Studies are strictly local,  carried out  in a  specific  technological 
context;  they are in the nature of a  monograph,  but  the results  sought 
are  independent of this  specific context.  Generalization is permitted 
because  these  results  concern patterns of  the  relationship between man  and 
his  environment  ( ••• )  The  accident or breakdown with which  we  are 
concerned  are by-products of  the operation of  a  system whose  frequency 
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can only be  changed  by  structural changes". 
Far-reaching action  to  improve  safety therefore involves  structural modi-
fication.  That  is the  lesson of research.  We  have  already  seen  from  the 
examples  quoted  that  the  social division of labour  - as  opposed  to  the 
technical division  - plays  an  important part in safety.  It is not  so 
much  the technical characteristics of a  particular task but  their inter-
relationship  and  the way  in which  they are controlled and  performed at an 
imposed  rate which  become  factors of unreliability that are difficult to 
determine. 
These  factors  form  the background  to  the  research.  But  they do  not give 
an  immediate  answer  to  the question of how  structures can  be changed. 
How  can  structures be determined  in  a  specific situation ? 
If we  close this  section with  this observation it might  seem  to  be  an ad-
mission of failure.  If safety is a  result and  that result requires  such  an  up-
heaval,  c~n research  reasonably be  expected  to  be  anything other  than 
purely descriptive and  completely cut off from  action which while practi-
cal has  a  limited  impact  ? 
That  of course is the conclusion  reached if we  do  not  seek  the link 
between  theory and practical intervention. 
Under  certain conditions  that  intervention may  take  the  form  of training 
in safety measures. 
But  before passing on  to  this  second  component  of our analysis  let us  take 
a  closer look at  the concrete possibilities  for  research in  the  field at 
the present  time.  Who  should  carry out  these  studies  ?  Workers,  external 
research specialists or mixed  teams  ? 
The  ideas we  have put  forward  on  the  subject of scientific practice take 
as  their basic  re·quirement  the need  for  an accumulation of data,  comparison 
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and  systematic  arrangement  of results. 
While  investigations  in the field can never  in future  do  without  subjective 
indices  - see Introduction  - this  does  not mean  that  such  indices  should 
replace all other analysis;  they are  simply  the beginning of a  task of 
cognitive appropriation,  the point of departure  for  a  longer progress 
requiring characterisation of the  social and  economic  system through rele-
vant variables  - the social and  economic  system must  be correctly related 
to  these  subjective indices. 
Let  us  consider  the  example of a  bank  in which one  department  has  been  ful-
ly automated;  interviews with  staff showed  dissatisfaction as  the staff 
concerned  said  that. they were much  more  tired  than  the  employees  in 
another identical non-automated  department. 
This  provides  the point of departure  for  an analysis if the  final  objective 
is to  improve working  conditions;  abolition of the  department  is probably 
neither realistic nor  the best  solution.  It is therefore essential to 
take account  of more  refined characteristics of  the  social and  technical 
system and  compare it with other systems with  differen~ levels of mechani-
zation;  human  variables must  be  introduced  - the possibility of maintaining 
satisfactory contacts,  the question of work  supervision and  the probable 
change  in production constraints etc ••• 
But  that research implies  a  measure of organization.  Can  it be  done  solely 
by  the workers  themselves  ? 
There are places where  a  constant collective evaluation is made  of the 
working  situation in enterprises  by  homogeneous  groups of workers  - we 
are  thinking  for  example of the Italian situation. 
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But  this is not  the case in Belgium or France  for  instance;  moreover it 
may  be  said  that  this  type of organization of  the workers  conflicts 
profoundly with  the notion of delegation which is at  the root of the 
existing bodies operating in the enterprises,  such as  trade unions. 
Consequently it is not  possible to  conceive of ideal  research structures 
in absolute  terms  and  we  must  take account of a  prior analysis of the 
real-life industrial situation.  So  far Community  research has  been con-
ducted  by  teams  of research workers  external to  the  factories  coming 
from university environments.  While  this may  be  the result of certain 
constraints it creates  the risk of bypassing  the real  problems  and 
concentrating on  topics which are not  those  felt  to  be  the most  important 
by  the workers;  there may  then be  a  regrettable confusion between  the 
possible objectives of the work.  That  is why  we  are moving  slowly  towards 
-mixed  research structures including representatives of organized  labour 
at  some  point or another in the analysis. 
0  0  0 
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4.  TRAINING 
Research has  enabled  incidents  and  accidents  to  be  seen not  as 
the result of human  error but  as  symptoms  of  the malfunctioning of the 
systems  at  the heart of which  they occur,  primarily  the  social and 
technical  system.  They  reflect  the  inadequacy of this  system,  possibly 
to meet  the production targets set,  but  above all with regard  to  the 
presence of man  as  an  individual with specific characteristics,  desires, 
limitations and  constraints.  To  speak  in ergonomics  terms  the  condi-
tions of work  are not  adapted  to man. 
The  relevance of this conclusion to  training is  immediately apparent; 
training by definition deals with  the human  factor. 
For  our purposes  - this is  a  fundamental  consideration  - it does  not 
deal with the human  factor as  the cause of accidents  but  as  the only 
factor able to modify working  conditions  in the  light of man's  own 
requirements.  It is precisely because man,  the worker,  supervisor or 
director,  is  potentially capable of bringing about  far-reaching  changes 
in the enterprise structures  - which are directly questioned when  the 
reliability of the  system is  low  - that  training in safety and  reliabil-
ity  is  necessary. 
This  training must  be  envisaged  as  a  pre-condition  for  change. 
But  there are different kinds  of change. 
To  the external observer  some  changes  appear as  total modifications of 
the  system of work  organization and  power  relationships within  the 
enterprise;  they are accompanied  by  a  collapse of the hierarchical pyra-
mid  and  tolerate other  forms  of work  control. 
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This  category includes  recent  Scandinavian experiments  in  job enrichment. 
But  these changes  are less  the result of an analysis of working  condi-
tions which applied before  the innovation  - this analysis  being  specific to 
each workshop  - than of an  a  priori idea,  the model  of organization 
which departs  from  Fordian concepts  which  have  been overtaken by  events 
and  no  longer enable productivity to  be  increased or  the growing malaise 
of a  society which  sees  the crisis approaching  to  be  faced. 
The  innovations  therefore correspond  to  an enterprise project  - sometimes 
almost  a  gamble  - an  expensive  experimental project whose  extension is 
not  self-evident.  Moreover only  the giant companies  - which use  assem-
bly line  forms  of production  - can be  involved.  This  explains why  our 
considerations  cannot  be  based  on  experiments which do  not  and 
cannot  for  a  long  time  concern all workers,  when  each day'is  important 
~nd safety and health are always matters of immediate  concern. 
That  is why,  without  denying  the value  and  interest of  job enrichment  as 
conceived  in certain privileged but  isolated cases,  we  are  thinking  in 
terms of a  much  more modestchange,  at least in the early stages.  This 
would  correspond  less  to  an overall enterprise project than  to  an oppor-
tunity  for workers  to  express  themselves.  It would  not  have  the value 
of an  experiment  but  it would  be  a  daily practice;  it would  not  be  an  ad-
justment  to  a  new  pattern of  job organization but  it would  result  from  a 
permanent analysis of working conditions  and  the working  environment. 
It would  not  be  sudden  transformation,  but  a  strategy of change  based on 
an  estimate of the harmful  factors  in  the situation which  are accessible 
to  intervention. 
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But  while workers  unanimously call  for  changes  in their 
working  conditions  they are not  the masters  of those conditions  : 
we  must  guard against  excessive  spontaneity. 
This  is where  training comes  in  :  it must  ensure  that change  does 
not  take place blindly on  an  isolated basis because of chance  factors 
and  disorganized  trends  in a  fluctuating  interplay of  forces;  it must 
ensure that  change is not  reduced  to  small  improvements  without  real 
substance;  it must  prepare  for  the more  distant  future. 
Unless  training is associated with  the wider  problem of  long-term 
action on  structures it will be destined  to  failure. 
Participants  in safety training programmes  who  only receive  theoreti-
cal instruction without  reference  to  the practical conditions  in 
which  they work  not  only do  not  benefit  from  this  but  on  the contrary 
lose in the process;  they  remain  for  a  long  time  convinced both of 
their inability to  take appropriate action and  of  the  inhibiting na-
ture of their environment  - an  environment  which  seems  to  them  to 
leave no  room  for  changes  of any  kind.  We  then have  a  return in  force 
to  the  idea of "defensive safety",  consisting entirely of  standards, 
instructions and means  of protection and  imbued  with· the notion of 
human  responsibility;  the accident  once  again acquires  the character 
of a  chance  incident  - but  a  chance  incident with  a  very special 
nature  :  it is  seen quite  simply as  the result of  the- impossibility 
of mastering  known  factors. 
In rigid environments,  where all change  is impossible,  safety  can 
only be  repressive;  training can only  point  to  the  human  factor as 
the prime  cause  - and  discussion with participants in  training of this 
kind would  not  show  any other ideas  :  the  stereotypes  and  cultural 
barriers to  safety flourish  spontaneously under  these conditions. 
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"Accidents are inevitable",  "people  should  take greater care"  etc ••• 
It is therefore apparent  that  these  ready-made  ideas which  one would 
like to  dismiss  a;  hasty  and  unfounded  convictions 
complicate  the problem because  they refer back  to  the  fundamental 
question of the possibility of  influencing the structure of the en-
terprise and  the organization of work  grafted on  to it. 
It is therefore in relation to  the content of accident 
theory  and  the resulting  teaching methods  that  the problem of 
safety training must  be circumscribed. 
What  are  the conditions necessary  for  a  theory of this kind  to  be an 
integral part of change or the causal  factor  in change  ?  How  should 
it be presented  ?  What  should  its practical  form  be  ? 
So  far  the question of determining  how  and under what  con-
ditions  the analysis  is translated into action has  not  been dealt with 
in the  teaching materialsproduced under  the auspices of the Commission 
of  the European Communities  :  it was  considered self-evident*). 
However,  the brief description of certain structural reliability 
factors  - see  Section 3  Research  - clearly shows  that  the continuity 
between knowledge  and  action cannot  be  considered self-evident.  Expe-
rience seems  to  confirm this oversight  :  the experimental  seminar  in 
Pont-A-Mousson,  organized by  the Commission of the  European  Communities 
for  Trade Unionists,  revealed  the gap  between  theory and practice,  and 
thus  enabled a  considerable step  forward  to  be  taken in the area of 
training. 
*) 
All  these materials  spoke of the need  to develop  a  spirit of analysis 
among  participants.  The  theory  taught  that only  environmental  changes 
could  influence  the safety and  reliability of the  system in the  long 
run  :  it advocated  an operational view of the causal  factors  of inci-
dents  but  failed  to  show  the conditions under which  those  incidents 
might  be  influenced. 
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Basing ourselves  on  the results of this  seminar  and  on other examples 
taken  from  industrial life,  we  shall try to  lay the  foundations  for 
methodological considerations  on  this subject. 
Recalling what  was  said in particular in  the  section on  research,  we 
shall characterize training as  a  two  stage operation 
1  need  to  leave  the  immediate  reality in order to  achieve 
a  more  structural view highlighting relationships which 
were originally hidden. 
2  need  to effect a  new  transformation of acquired knowl-
edge  in order  to  locate  it in reality again  and  enable 
*) 
it to  serve as  a  stimulus  for  change 
This  two  stage operation which  links  the  level of abstraction 
with  that of operational  intervention might  be  seen strictly from  the 
instructional  angle  :  that is to  say as  the condition necessary  for 
the complete  success of training in the  sense  in which  Piaget would 
have  used  the  term.  But  this would  also  amount  to  considering  training 
very narrowly  as  an  end  in itself related  to  the  individual  subject. 
We  prefer  to  see it as  an  element  which  cannot  be  isolated  from  a 
more  general  structure  it thus  acquires  a  collective social status 
- training is not  an  end  in itself but  a  means  of changing  something. 
It is therefore important  to  ensure harmony  between  the  teaching 
conditions  necessary  for  the  success of this  training  and  the  aims 
*) 
It is apparent,  as  we  shall  see in paragraph 5,  that  in  the  final 
analysis  intervention on  the  environmental  structures will depend 
on  the interplay of forces  in the enterprises  and  the decision will 
be of a  political and  economic  nature;  however,  this argument  is 
too  often  invoked  to  hide  the  lack of a  programme  of change  and  the 
lack of systematic  reflection on  the  subject of safety. 
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pursued,  with a  view  to  improving  the reliability of  the  system  - the 
worker of course always  being  the axis of reference  for  this reliabil-
ity. 
Let  us  therefore consider  the  two  stages again and  develop 
them  further. 
1  ...  need  to  leave  the  level of  immediate reality 
The  hidden  relationships which  dete~ine the  dynamics  of a 
system cannot  be  revealed  simply by  stating  these relationships. 
Active participation by  the person  studying  them  is also necessary. 
Simple  enumeration during  a  course of training  of "non-immediate" 
reliability factors  overlooks  the aspect of creative activity which 
is essential  in the participant and  at the  same  time creates confu-
sion by  tending  to minimise  the margin  between  immediate  and  non-
immediate  factors,  thus making all factors  homogeneous. 
Let  us  explain this more  clearly  :  the reliability factors  linked 
with the workplace  for  example  cannot  for  the most  part be  equated 
with reliability black spots  - see  Section 2,  Research.  The  fo~er 
can  be  reduced  by  isolated ergonomic  acts  whereas  the  latter_ are 
more  general  and  hidden under many  different manifestations.  They 
cannot  be mastered at once  and  require readaptation. 
But  it is not  sufficient to  stress the heterogeneous  nature of the 
factors  involved;  we  must  also  show  - or make  it apparent  - that  these 
structural  factors  are not  only general  and  not  only hidden  by  some 
chance condition but  are  in reality hidden  by  the situation itself. 
Let  us  take a  simple  example,  that of the  film "Learning Safety" 
produced  by  the Industrial  Psychology Laboratory of  the Free University 
of Brussels under  the  auspices of the European Commission,  in an accel-
erated vocational  training centre of the Belgian National  Employment 
Office.  The  National  Employment  Offi  provides accelerated training 
for unemployed  persons  and workers  wishing  to  acquire qualifications 
better adapted  to  available  jobs. 
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This  training  takes  place in centres which  have all kinds  of specialized 
workshops  but whose  structure is  - paradoxically enough  - administrative. 
The  film was  written and  acted  by  instructors  and  trainees  in a  particu-
lar centre and  showed  six accidents  in six different workshops.  One  of 
them  contains  the  following  situation  :  twenty  trainees in carpentry and 
concrete shuttering are assembling  scaffolding;  this  task,  of which  the 
main  action  takes  place on  a  raised platform,  requires  the  transport of 
wooden  beams. 
During one of these  transport operations  a  trainee  stumbles  and  falls 
off the platform.  A  filmed  analysis  follows  this accident  and 
extremely interesting  :  the  trainees  and  instructors who  produced  the 
film and  therefore belong  to  the accelerated vocational  training centre 
in question,  express what  they  see as  the causes of the accident. 
Among  the many  opinions  expressed  some  refer  to  the clumsiness of the 
workers  or say that  they  should  have  been wearing  a  helmet  with  a  chin-
strap,whose effectiveness  in the  fall would  of course  be minimal 
- but  nobody  stresses the situation of co-activity which is nevertheless 
characteristic  :  the  scene  takes  place on  a  cramped  platform with con-
stant movement  and  each  trainee working  individually in his little 
corner. 
We  consider this omission  in  the analysis  extremely interesting.  Espe-
cially as it was  repeated whenever  the  film was  used  in this centre  for 
training purposes  - the participants who  had  watched  the  film were  asked 
to  supplement  the  filmed  analysis of the ac.cident  by  their own  opinion  -
but  the omission was  never observed when  this  instructional  film was 
screened outside  the centre,  even  when  the  screening  formed  part of the 
training course  for people attached  to  the National  Employment  Office. 
What  is the explanation  for  this  ? 
Structures  have  an  imprisoning  power which  guarantees  their own  stabil-
ity;  they  draw  their own  frame  of reference within which  reflection 
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takes  place.  Any  attempt  to  change  them,  however  slightly,  involves  a 
considerable effort and obliges  a  different approach  to  be  adopted. 
In  the case of this  film elimination of the situation of co-activity 
amounted  to  interference with  the organization of apprenticeship  -
and  here  the  cumbersome  administrative nature of the semi-state body 
applied with all its weight.  Consequently  - see  the  filmed  commen-
taries  - safety was  understood in repressive  terms  with instructions 
and  infringements,  or defensively,  with helmets  and chin-straps. 
Thus  the need  is apparent  for abstraction  from  reality al-
though  this abstraction is  rendered difficult by  the constraints  and 
hold of the  environment  :  there are obstacles  and  cultural barriers. 
What  pedagogical  lessons  can be  drawn  from  this analysis  ?  First the 
individual,  the participant, must  be  set at a  distance  from  his  own 
situation.  The  teaching material must  amount  to  a  removal  from  his 
usual  surroundings. 
reflecting reality. 
Bu.t  at the  same  time it must  be  rich material 
It is easy  to  design  teaching  tools which are 
nothing but  simplistic  caricatured reflections of  narrow reality; 
by controlling at  the  source critical factors,  aspects which are always 
masked  by  the constraints of associated political,  social and  economic 
systems  appear as  established data.  The  mechanism of critical discov-
ery is not  called into play. 
Hence  the new  idea in safety training of working  not  on  the 
basis of an  exhaustive list of reliability factors  - but with reports 
supported  by  industrial monographs,the characteristics of which are 
fully known;  the participants are  then  asked  to work with this  living 
material  and  extract  the pertinent  factors  for  themselves. 
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The  criticism voiced during  the  Pont-A-Mousson  seminar of the  educational 
game  approach  - presenting analogies with  the classical business  games  -
are therefore readily understandable. 
This  tool  appeared  as  the prototype of a  technocratic  training  instrument 
which,  having  removed  the essential characteristics of safety - in partic-
ular the aspect of lying at  the point of intersection of various  social 
and  economic  influences while  seeking despite everything  to maintain 
primacy  for  the  individual  above all technical considerations  - presented 
safety as  an  ideological  reflection of reality. 
We  thus  noted absolute rejection by  the workers  of all teaching material 
taking  the  form  of games  - whereas  the  film referred  to  above was  given 
a  better reception as  being  an  altogether credible "slice of life". 
2  •.•  a  new  transformation of acquired knowledge 
However,  knowledge  already acquired  through  the work  of deci-
phering  teaching material  - and  guaranteeing  a  distance  from  the initial 
working  environment of the participants  - does  not  automatically bring 
the desired changes. 
Even  if the  fact of recognizing  the mechanism  by  which certain relation-
ships are hidden  leads  to  a  wish  to  change  frozen  structures,  that wish 
in itself is not  enough.  To  change  something,  and  to control  the tran-
sition  from  one  state to another,  concrete references  and  fixed  points 
are needed. 
Initially reliability factors  seem  to  provide no  fixed  references at all. 
They  are inherent  in almost  any working  situation and if they are to 
become  references  they must  be  defined  in one  form or another. 
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When  a  train begins  to move  and  leaves  the station,  the passenger can 
only recognize  the  fact  by  watching  a  point on  the platform  :  to 
speak of movement  we  require  a  fixed  reference in relation to which  a 
distance can be calculated.  The  fixed  element  - the origin or refer-
ence  - referred to  here deserves all our attention. 
We  can attempt  to  see  how  it has  been interpreted in certain applica-
tions of  accident  theory 
conclusions. 
in order to extract certain general 
It appears  that in some  cases  the material  transposition of a 
general  factor is possible in the  specific  incidence of a  given envi-
ronment.  The  ergonomic  analysis of a  monorail  carried out  in 1971  in 
the coalmining  industry by  a  team of researchers  from  the Centre  for 
Human  Studies  and  Problems  provides  a  convincing illustration of this. 
The  research workers  tried  to  characterize a  transport  system serving 
the coalfaces  from  the angle of reliability and  with a  view  to practi-
cal  improvements.  They  therefore defined a  series of variables  based 
directly on  factors  stemming  from  accident  theory but  transposed  and 
adapted  to  their owri  working  environment.  We  shall choose  two  of  these 
variables,  the first concerned with the  factor of coactivity and  the 
second with that of signalling. 
a.  "coactivity" 
It was  necessary  to  determine  a  variable,  referring back  to 
the coactivity factor,  but  enabling  a  monorail  system to be  compared 
from  this angle with an alternative system  - the relative merits being 
weighed  up.  The  variable chosen was  the hierarchical distance between 
individuals working  together in the installations. 
A quotation  from  the text  shows  how  this choice  - which  appears  strange 
at first  sight  - was  arrived at 
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"In most  organizations  the different working cells are arranged according 
to  a  hierarchical  structure.  This  becomes  apparent  when  the staff organ-
igramme  of the organization is drawn  up.  One  of  the  roles at each hier-
archical  level is to  coordinate the cells dependent  on it.  The  greater 
the distance between cells  (calculated by  counting  the number  of points 
on  the hierarchical graph between  two  cells),  the  less  easy it will  be 
to  ensure coordination.  The  presence at a  single place of several working 
cells widely  separated in hierarchical  terms,  is a  cause of many  difficul-
ties. 
The  term coactivity is also used  to designate situations of  the  same 
kind  :  cells with different aims,  working  habits  and  tools which  have  to 
exist side by  side.  An  example of these situations  and  their consequences 
is provided by  the maintenance personnel  working at operating stations 
under poor conditions  (drive head  lubricator in a  roadway with  a  monorail 
system,  locomotive drivers  depending  on more  than one pit). 
Manager 
Mine  working 
engileer ~~ 
Mine  overman 
/  \. 
Overman  Overman 
Coal  seam 
engineer 
t 
Mine  overman 
l 
Coalface  1  Coal face 
Coal  seam  overman 
Winch  ope~ervisor  l 
landing  1  Motor  supervisor  2 
Motor  supervisor  1 
example  the distance between motor  supervisors  1  and  2  is  8 
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In this-case  the coactivity at a  particular coalface  served  by  a  mono-
rail of  a  given  type  becomes  something  palpable which can be modified 
by  a  reorganization of the work  and  individual  tasks,  by  a  different 
layout of the monorail;  a  practical calculation can be made  by  adding 
together  the  total  recorded  indexes,  divided  by  the number  of individ-
uals. 
But  this  example  is specific  to  the  environment  in question;  let us 
return  for  a  moment  to  the situation of coactivity shown  in the  film 
"Learning Safety".  On  the platform with its many  trainee carpenters  -
concrete shuttering workers,  the hierarchical distance calculated in 
this way  would  have  been  two  in each case;  in this instance a  relevant 
index would  have  had  to  take account  of the  space,  the number  of dif-
ferent  tasks  to  be  performed  and  the number  of trainees. 
Consequently we  begin  to  recognize  the highly subjective 
nature of the reference points  taken  :  they are only meaningful  in 
relation to  a  specific context  and  the degree of meaning  is determined 
by  a  collective evaluation.  This  subjective character of  the variable, 
even when  it appears  quantified,  is even more  apparent  in the "sig-
nalling"  factor. 
b.  "signalling" 
The  document  states  that  "For  the driver's workplace( ••• ),  a 
comparison is made  between  the signals which  can be  recognized  in the 
cab  and  the  signals which  are useful  for  driving purposes.  Each  signal 
is given  a  mark  between  0  and  2.0  - means  a  signal which  cannot  be  de-
tected,  1  - a  signal which  can be barely detected  and  2  - a  clearly 
perceptible signal". 
The  workers  themselves  therefore have  to  determine what  is 
useful or not,  satisfactory or not;  the criterion or standard taken, 
on  the basis of which  the change will  later be measured,  depends 
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ultimately on  a  group  consensus.  The  study in question insists on  the 
essential need  to  reach agreement  between  the groups  concerned  :  the 
management,  foremen,  workers  and  representatives if the operation is 
to  be  successful.  In another  study which  we  ourselves  conducted,  a 
structural  index  for  the reliability of a  rolling mill was  found  by 
the  same  method,  i.e.  by  questioning workers  in  the  field.  It was 
thus possible  to  quantify a  variable not  in arbitrary  te~s but  on  the 
basis of a  subjective estimate of its relevance;  we  needed  an  index 
for  regulation of the  rolling mill  line.  Investigations conducted 
among  the staff in the  factory  led  to  the  conclusion  that  good  regula-
tion was  reflected in a  particular configuration  of the  incandescent 
bars waiting  in  front of the different cages.  When  this configuration 
did not  appear,  the  regulation variable was  zero;  when  it did appear 
the variable assumed  the value of 1. 
An  external  research worker could not  have  arrived at this configura-
tion which was  based on  the experience of workers.  The  same  idea of 
reference  to  subjective assessment  for  the purpose of fixing  the valid 
norm  for  reliability or  safety is also  found  in the Italian document 
entitled "Ambiente di Lavoro"  ("Working  Environment")  drawn  up  jointly 
by  the  three Italian trade union confederations. 
This  text,which provides  a  method  of analysing  the working  situation 
with a  view  to  determining criteria for  improvements  to  this environ-
ment  stresses  the  fact  that ultimately it is  the  subjective criterion 
which must  be  taken into account  for  safety purposes. 
When  a  temperature is measured with  the  aid of suitable instruments  the 
measurement  is only relevant  in relation to  a  collective  judgment  and 
not  to  the  letter of  the  law  - the workshop  may  give  the  impression of 
being cold,  even  though  the  temperature is 22°C.  The  same  applies  to 
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the concentration of  toxic gases  :  there are  legally acceptable maximum 
concentration values,  but  these are  reduced if thirty workers  declare 
that  they are adversely affected by  concentrations  lower  than  those 
stipulated in the legislation. 
c •...  conclusion 
Whenever  an  attempt  is made  in research and  training  to  combine 
analysis  and  action,  we  are  faced with  the  same  requirement  :  working 
from  very general  factors  characterizing the relationship between dif-
ferent  systems,  objectifiable indices must  be  drawn  up  on  the basis of 
*) 
a  norm  determined  by  a  consensus of all the workers  involved 
Because  safety,  as it is understood  in  the  research conducted under  the 
auspices  of the European Commission,  is not  normative  and contains  the 
idea that  there are no  ready-made  solutions or necessarily good  lines 
of conduct,  it is set apart  from  current regulations  and  contains  an 
implicit  reference  to  the  experience and  judgments  of workers  in the 
sectors under consideration. 
However,  this concept  - which  is clearly reflected in the industrial 
applications of reliability - has  not  been  incorporated  into  the  teaching 
material  produced  so  far.  This  is an  important  gap  which will have  to 
be  filled  :  more  work will  have  to  be  done with examples  representing 
*) 
The  idea of a  norm  or reference must  not  be  confused with the scien-
tific assumption  that everything must  be quantified at all costs; 
that is certainly not  our point of view. 
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a  practical reflection of general  factors if safety training is to 
become  a  bridge between  theory and  the experience of the partici-
pating persons,  and  a  basis  for action in  the  field carried out  in 
the interests and with the cooperation of the workers  concerned. 
0  0  0 
We  are only interested in norms  insofar as  they  represent  a  collective 
evaluation and  serve as  a  reference point  for  change. 
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5.  PRACTICAL  ACTION 
Action is undertaken  as  soon as  a  decision is reached on  the 
factor or factors  to  be  changed.  Action  on  the working  environment 
may  therefore be  said  to  escape  from  the direct responsibility of 
research experts.  It will  in each case  be  the result of  an  interplay of 
forces  in which politics,  economics  and  social considerations 
play the key  role. 
An  attempt  can be made  to  influence  this  interplay;  we  may  try to  find 
arguments  capable of tilting the balance.  An  attempt might  be made 
for  example  to  persuade unenlightened  employers  that  improvements  in 
reliability would  have  favourable  economic  consequences,  that  safety 
and  productivity are  linked.  Trade union representatives might  be 
told that  the  inclusion of safety among  their demands  would  strengthen 
their position and union  power.  Safety may  be given  an  instrumental 
character and different observations made  about it, depending  on  the 
person  to  whom  the observations  are  addressed  - safety thus  assumes 
many  different  facets;  the choice of words  and  scope of the arguments 
used would  then  depend  on  a  given  framework  and  not  on  the content.  The 
latter would  be  drained of all substance.  We  do  not  consider it de-
sirable to move  along  those  lines. 
There is no  doubt,  indeed it is normal  and  inevitable,  that 
safety will  assume  a  different colouring when  it becomes  part of a 
specific practice exercised by  a  given institutional apparatus  - the 
union or the industrial channel  as  such. 
But  some  concepts of safety can at the outset only  come  from  external 
sources,  breaking with the constraints of the enterprise and  the cul-
tural barriers specific  to  individual situations. 
The  contribution of the Commission  of  the  European  Communities  in  the  mat-
ter of research and  training in  the area of safety must  not  be merely an 
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appeal  or a  convincing  line of argument  but  a  means  of widening  the 
range of possible action  :  while  the criteria of productivity and 
legal provisions  have  an  important  bearing on  safety and practical 
action in this  sphere,  they are not  the  sole determining  factors. 
Often  the  decisive  argument  "It is not  for  us  to  take  the decision", 
"We  have  no  authority  to ...  "  is put  forward  simply  to  hide  an  absence 
of practical  thought  on  the matter. 
A strategy is after all always  possible  :  if reliability is threatened 
by  a  series of factors,  one or  the other may  be  influenced depending 
on what  is desirable at a  particular time.  The  notion of choice and 
strategy,  of short  and  long  term,  centre directly on  the  comments 
made  in the previous paragraphs.  The  concrete analysis of a  system 
and its evaluation enable us  to  choose  the point of attack and  de-
termine modifications  for  the  future.  It enables  us  to correct,  com-
pare and  anticipate  - anticipate  the  impact of a  reorganization,  a 
new  machine  installation,  a  new  timetable etc. 
The  original contribution of research-workers  in  the area of safety 
resides  in  the  elaboration,  with  the workers  directly concerned,  of 
a  very precise analytical policy which  pushes  back  the  limits of what 
is possible,  opens  new  paths  and  blocks all idle arguments. 
Let  us  return for  a  moment  to  the  study of  the  bank where  two  departments 
were  compared  :  one  in which operations were  done manually and  the 
other where  they were  done  by  computer.  When  employees  were  questioned 
they  stated that nervous  fatigue  was  greater in the mechanized  service 
than  in  the other. 
Presented  in these  terms,  this  study  leads workers  to  a  deadlock situ-
ation.  It is unlikely that  they would  manage  to  have  the  automated 
service abolished  and  such abolition would  not  solve  the problem. 
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The  philosophy of Rousseau,  a  return to  the craft era,  is a  facile 
trap often held out  to workers.  Of  course certain  fo~s of  job 
enrichment  are desirable;  we  cannot  accept  a  soul-destroying  form 
of assembly  line work  on  the pretext  that it is economically 
viablej  but  sufficient emphasis  is not  placed on  the  fact  that 
mechanization or automation  is not  itself  responsible;  the 
problem lies in the way  in which  it  has  been designed  and  in-
troduced  - programmed  and  supervised. 
Nervous  fatigue  is an overall  index;  what  are  the  employees 
bothered by  :  the working  rates  ?  noise  ?  the  loss of certain 
human  contacts  ?  the impossibility of  taking  a  break  ?  A  study of 
the reliability of  the  system  - as  we  understand it, i.e. calling 
upon  indices  dete~ined by  the workers  themselves  - would  show  in 
a  more  operational manner  than  a  negative  judgment  on mechanization 
in general,  the  type of reorganization  to be proposed  - and  here we 
arrive at the area of practical action to  be  advocated  and  applied. 
Finally it appears  that  the  task of research and  training 
in safety is basically to-begin  a  forward movement  and  show  the 
factors  in the  real situation which must  be called into play so  as 
to  avoid  hasty and  superficial corrections  and  to  rationalize the 
working  environment,  not merely  in technical  and  economic  te~s, as 
is usually  the case,  but  against  the background of ultimate objec-
tives which it is  for others  to  defend  and meet. 
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